{"en":"New Quality Problems Rock Boeing And Trigger FAA Probe"}')>
New Quality Problems Rock Boeing And Trigger FAA Probe
New Quality Problems Rock Boeing And Trigger FAA Probe
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Mandatory inspections triggered by the nearly disastrous Jan. 5 inflight loss of a fuselage insert from an Alaska Airlines Boeing 737-9 point to production problems traced to aerostructures supplier Spirit AeroSystems, creating both a plausible explanation of what happened to the Alaska aircraft and a deepening crisis at Boeing.
Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun said preliminary findings of loose exit door-plug assembly hardware at Alaska and United Airlines are linked to a “quality escape” at Spirit.Production issues are being reviewed in Alaska Airlines accident probeMost 737-9s have been grounded as risks and response are assessedIssue ramps up pressure on Boeing and FAA
“That's the description of what people are finding in their inspections,” Calhoun told CNBC in Boeing's first media interview following the Alaska accident. “It's something that escaped from the manufacturing process.”
Calhoun indicated the problems originated at Spirit's Wichita production facility that supplies 737 program fuselage sections, including inserts, or plugs, that some carriers use to block unneeded emergency exits.
“We're not going to point fingers,” he said. “Yes, it escaped their factory, but then it escaped ours, too. So we're all in this together.”
The FAA on Jan. 10 opened a formal investigation into whether Boeing's role in not flagging nonconforming assemblies violates its production certificate approval and agency regulations.
“Boeing may have failed to ensure its completed products conformed to its approved design and were in a condition for safe operation in accordance with quality system inspection and test procedures,” the agency wrote in a letter to Boeing, citing the accident and “additional discrepancies” on other 737-9s.
Alaska Flight 1282, 737-9 Line No. 8789 delivered to Alaska Oct. 31, departed Portland, Oregon, at 4:52 p.m. local time Jan. 5 on a routine run to Ontario, California. About 6 min. into the flight, as the aircraft was climbing through 14,800 ft., the plug covering the left side midcabin exit door (MED) opening tore free, preliminary information released by the NTSB said. The aircraft experienced an immediate rapid decompression. The flight crew declared an emergency and returned to Portland, where the aircraft, with 171 passengers and six crew members, landed safely 14 min. later.
Alaska immediately grounded its 737-9s. Regulators mandated the grounding in a Jan. 6 emergency airworthiness directive (AD) issued by the FAA and adopted by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency as well as other civil aviation authorities. The FAA said its order would integrate Boeing inspection and repair instructions for 737-9s with door-plug assemblies that have not been inspected during a routine heavy maintenance visit every 4,000 cycles. This, the agency said, amounts to 171 aircraft. Some 737-900ERs have the same plug assemblies, but those aircraft were not covered by FAA's order. The aircraft involved in the accident had about 130 cycles.
The FAA said the checks would take a maximum of 8 hr. per aircraft, giving affected carriers hope that they would have their workhorse narrowbodies back promptly. But Boeing and the FAA have grappled over finalizing the needed instructions, creating major headaches for operators.
Alaska and United, with 65 and 79 aircraft, respectively, said their entire 737-9 fleets have been grounded—even though some airframes have gone through heavy checks that include door-plug service. Others, such as Indonesian low-cost carrier Lion Air, parked higher-capacity 737-9s that have functioning MEDs and are not covered by the AD.
The FAA said Jan. 8 that it approved Boeing's compliance process, only to reverse course on Jan. 9.An exit door-plug ripped off Alaska Airlines Flight 1282, causing a rapid decompression and forcing an emergency landing. Credit: NTSB
Since door-plug assembly inspections are part of routine 737-9 maintenance, instructions should be easy to integrate into bulletins for complying with the FAA's AD. One former FAA safety official tells Aviation Week that, given the possible link to the Alaska accident, the agency is likely focusing on the ramifications of dealing with any findings and demanding that Boeing justify its recommended protocols.
“The inspection is easy,” the former official says. “The problem is: What do you do when you find a loose part? Do you go back to the torquing? Is it sufficient as specified or does the design need to be improved?”
If investigators determine a single part, such as an incorrectly torqued bolt, started the chain of events that led to an exit plug departing a two-month-old aircraft while in flight, a more extensive fix may be required, the former FAA official suggests.
“What is the scope?” the official continued. “Is it limited to the 737-9, or does it extend to the 737-900ER? That's some of the stuff I'm sure [Boeing and the FAA] are struggling with.”
The 737-9 has two so-called Type 1 MEDs, each measuring 26 X 51 in., located aft of the trailing edge of the wing on the left and right sides of the fuselage.When activated, the additional emergency exit doors enable higher-capacity configurations for up to 220 passengers. However, as Alaska does not operate the 737-9 in these denser seating arrangements, the MED exits are blocked off with plugs to save weight. The plug configuration limits capacity to 189 passengers; Alaska's 737-9s have 178 seats.
The plug configuration—one of two options Boeing offers to deactivate MED exits on a 737-9—incorporates a standard window and is concealed behind a cabin interior sidewall panel section.
Space for the plugs is cut into every 737-9 fuselage, regardless of the intended customer's planned cabin configuration. Most operators that do not need the extra exits opt for plug assemblies to deactivate them. Some, such as Iceland-air, choose a regular exit door that is then deactivated and covered with interior sidewall. The plug option is lighter and requires less maintenance—although significant modification would be necessary if an operator determines it wants to install a usable emergency exit.
Regardless of the chosen configuration, Spirit assembles the 737-9 fuselages, including any MEDs or plugs. The assembly is then shipped via rail to Boeing for final assembly. Between receipt and aircraft delivery, the fuselages are tested at least twice, sources with knowledge of the process tell Aviation Week. One test involves pressurizing the cabin.
Absent a problem detected during the tests, door-plug assembles are not supposed to be touched or modified.
“That's standard operating procedure,” one source says. “They are considered part of the structure.”
Other fuselage openings, such as main cabin doors, are used to move seats and other interior components into the aircraft during assembly. But the plugs are not removed to aid in the final assembly process, the sources say. If followed, Boeing's 737-9 manufacturing process means plug assemblies are last touched on Spirit's factory floor.
As Boeing and the FAA unravel the scope of the 737-9 door-plug assembly problems, the NTSB is working to pinpoint what happened on Alaska Flight 1282. Initial examination of the recovered door plug and the hole it left in the airframe showed that two guide roller tracks, one on each side near the plug's top, were fractured, NTSB engineer Clint Crookshanks said in a Jan. 8 media briefing. The fractures did not cause the plug failure but happened as the panel broke away, he added.
The plug is fixed in place during normal operations, but it is designed to move for routine maintenance inspections and to aid initial installation.
The plug's design includes 12 “stop-fitting” device fittings that keep the insert from moving outward (see diagram, page 14). When the plug is in place, fittings on it match up with stop pads around the frame. Two hinges along the plug's bottom and two guide roller fittings—one on each side of the plug near the top that fit into rollers attached to the frame—allow the plug to move up so its fittings can clear the pads and swing outward. But upward movement is possible only if four bolts are removed, effectively unlocking the plug. The bolts, secured by castellated nuts and cotter pins, are installed horizontally near each hinge and through each roller fitting.
“The exam to date has shown that the [door plug] did translate upward [and] all 12 stops became disengaged, allowing it to blow out of the fuselage,” Crookshanks said. “We have not yet recovered the four bolts that restrain it from its vertical movement, and we have not yet determined if they existed.”
Crookshanks said closer examination of the plug and other parts will reveal if each bolt worked itself free or failed—or if the bolts were never installed. Determining what happened to the four bolts is key to understanding the accident and ascertaining whether Boeing has one or multiple 737-9 problems. An initial examination of the MED on the accident aircraft's right side found no anomalies.
Several fortunate variables limited the severity of the Alaska accident, NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy said. The two seats in Row 26 right next to the plug that tore free were not occupied. The event's timing—during climb, when passengers are often seated and belted in, instead of during cruise, when both passengers and cabin attendants are moving around—also minimized the risk, she suggested. Another lucky element in the accident sequence: The plug did not strike any part of the airframe or tail assembly.
Interior damage was significant, investigators reported. Ten rows of seats had some level of damage.
Spirit on Jan. 10 issued a statement confirming it “has been working closely with” Boeing since the accident and “is now supporting the NTSB's investigation directly.” It did not address Calhoun's comments.
Spirit's role in the 737-9 groundings expands an already lengthy list of production problems that have affected both the 737 and 787 programs—its two largest—for several years. But the plug assembly problem stands out as the first production-quality shortcoming linked to a safety-of-flight issue, triggering a fleet grounding at least and leading to an accident at worst.
“We have not had safety-related” nonconformances, Calhoun said. “This one is, and it's very important that we understand that.”
Calhoun stopped short of drawing a direct line from the fleet findings and the Alaska accident. But his comments to CNBC strongly suggest the manufacturer suspects the two are linked.
“This one is a horrible escape,” Calhoun said. “And we will tackle this one the same way [as previous issues]. We will engineer answers and be certain that can never happen again. We will look everywhere around the [737] MAX, around the Spirit factories, our own factories, our inspection processes.
“We'll make sure that we take steps to ensure that it never, never can happen again,” he added.
Beyond the reputational damage both Boeing and Spirit have suffered from the new problems, Wall Street has two questions: What are the upfront costs that will be incurred this quarter? And what are the long-term risks to production forecasts?
Upfront costs to the manufacturers to make customers whole again seem manageable, assuming they are short-lived, many financial analysts say. Based on Alaska financials, Bloomberg Intelligence estimates a cost of $25,000-30,000 a day of lost profit and crew costs due to grounded 737-9s. The initial grounding of all 170-odd aircraft could cost $5-7 million a day.
Another estimate sees costs closer to $15,000 a day. Still, according to Jefferies analysts, a two-week pause in operations could lead to $36 million in concessions.
In the longer term, however, ramifications are harder to estimate. For starters, the new master agreement Boeing and Spirit reached last fall does not obviate issues beyond the tail fin and aft bulkhead pressure fixes identified last year. It is possible that Boeing could demand new payment from Spirit related to the plug issue.
The good news: Analysts believe firm orders remain secure. “Airlines are generally unlikely to cancel a firm order given the amount of money they have to spend when initially placing the order and subsequently as production progresses,” analysts at RBC Capital Markets said Jan. 9. With more than 6,200 unfilled orders, including nearly 4,800 737 MAX-family variants, RBC said the concern around Boeing should still be focused on production execution for deliveries.
Therein lies the rub. Monthly 737 production has remained volatile for years, despite stabilization being a primary goal voiced by Boeing and Tier 1 suppliers. If the plug issue is found to be a manufacturing issue, it will only cause more perturbation.
Boeing CEO Dave Calhoun said preliminary findings of loose exit door-plug assembly hardware at Alaska and United Airlines are linked to a “quality escape” at Spirit.Production issues are being reviewed in Alaska Airlines accident probeMost 737-9s have been grounded as risks and response are assessedIssue ramps up pressure on Boeing and FAA
“That's the description of what people are finding in their inspections,” Calhoun told CNBC in Boeing's first media interview following the Alaska accident. “It's something that escaped from the manufacturing process.”
Calhoun indicated the problems originated at Spirit's Wichita production facility that supplies 737 program fuselage sections, including inserts, or plugs, that some carriers use to block unneeded emergency exits.
“We're not going to point fingers,” he said. “Yes, it escaped their factory, but then it escaped ours, too. So we're all in this together.”
The FAA on Jan. 10 opened a formal investigation into whether Boeing's role in not flagging nonconforming assemblies violates its production certificate approval and agency regulations.
“Boeing may have failed to ensure its completed products conformed to its approved design and were in a condition for safe operation in accordance with quality system inspection and test procedures,” the agency wrote in a letter to Boeing, citing the accident and “additional discrepancies” on other 737-9s.
Alaska Flight 1282, 737-9 Line No. 8789 delivered to Alaska Oct. 31, departed Portland, Oregon, at 4:52 p.m. local time Jan. 5 on a routine run to Ontario, California. About 6 min. into the flight, as the aircraft was climbing through 14,800 ft., the plug covering the left side midcabin exit door (MED) opening tore free, preliminary information released by the NTSB said. The aircraft experienced an immediate rapid decompression. The flight crew declared an emergency and returned to Portland, where the aircraft, with 171 passengers and six crew members, landed safely 14 min. later.
Alaska immediately grounded its 737-9s. Regulators mandated the grounding in a Jan. 6 emergency airworthiness directive (AD) issued by the FAA and adopted by the European Union Aviation Safety Agency as well as other civil aviation authorities. The FAA said its order would integrate Boeing inspection and repair instructions for 737-9s with door-plug assemblies that have not been inspected during a routine heavy maintenance visit every 4,000 cycles. This, the agency said, amounts to 171 aircraft. Some 737-900ERs have the same plug assemblies, but those aircraft were not covered by FAA's order. The aircraft involved in the accident had about 130 cycles.
The FAA said the checks would take a maximum of 8 hr. per aircraft, giving affected carriers hope that they would have their workhorse narrowbodies back promptly. But Boeing and the FAA have grappled over finalizing the needed instructions, creating major headaches for operators.
Alaska and United, with 65 and 79 aircraft, respectively, said their entire 737-9 fleets have been grounded—even though some airframes have gone through heavy checks that include door-plug service. Others, such as Indonesian low-cost carrier Lion Air, parked higher-capacity 737-9s that have functioning MEDs and are not covered by the AD.
The FAA said Jan. 8 that it approved Boeing's compliance process, only to reverse course on Jan. 9.An exit door-plug ripped off Alaska Airlines Flight 1282, causing a rapid decompression and forcing an emergency landing. Credit: NTSB
Since door-plug assembly inspections are part of routine 737-9 maintenance, instructions should be easy to integrate into bulletins for complying with the FAA's AD. One former FAA safety official tells Aviation Week that, given the possible link to the Alaska accident, the agency is likely focusing on the ramifications of dealing with any findings and demanding that Boeing justify its recommended protocols.
“The inspection is easy,” the former official says. “The problem is: What do you do when you find a loose part? Do you go back to the torquing? Is it sufficient as specified or does the design need to be improved?”
If investigators determine a single part, such as an incorrectly torqued bolt, started the chain of events that led to an exit plug departing a two-month-old aircraft while in flight, a more extensive fix may be required, the former FAA official suggests.
“What is the scope?” the official continued. “Is it limited to the 737-9, or does it extend to the 737-900ER? That's some of the stuff I'm sure [Boeing and the FAA] are struggling with.”
The 737-9 has two so-called Type 1 MEDs, each measuring 26 X 51 in., located aft of the trailing edge of the wing on the left and right sides of the fuselage.When activated, the additional emergency exit doors enable higher-capacity configurations for up to 220 passengers. However, as Alaska does not operate the 737-9 in these denser seating arrangements, the MED exits are blocked off with plugs to save weight. The plug configuration limits capacity to 189 passengers; Alaska's 737-9s have 178 seats.
The plug configuration—one of two options Boeing offers to deactivate MED exits on a 737-9—incorporates a standard window and is concealed behind a cabin interior sidewall panel section.
Space for the plugs is cut into every 737-9 fuselage, regardless of the intended customer's planned cabin configuration. Most operators that do not need the extra exits opt for plug assemblies to deactivate them. Some, such as Iceland-air, choose a regular exit door that is then deactivated and covered with interior sidewall. The plug option is lighter and requires less maintenance—although significant modification would be necessary if an operator determines it wants to install a usable emergency exit.
Regardless of the chosen configuration, Spirit assembles the 737-9 fuselages, including any MEDs or plugs. The assembly is then shipped via rail to Boeing for final assembly. Between receipt and aircraft delivery, the fuselages are tested at least twice, sources with knowledge of the process tell Aviation Week. One test involves pressurizing the cabin.
Absent a problem detected during the tests, door-plug assembles are not supposed to be touched or modified.
“That's standard operating procedure,” one source says. “They are considered part of the structure.”
Other fuselage openings, such as main cabin doors, are used to move seats and other interior components into the aircraft during assembly. But the plugs are not removed to aid in the final assembly process, the sources say. If followed, Boeing's 737-9 manufacturing process means plug assemblies are last touched on Spirit's factory floor.
As Boeing and the FAA unravel the scope of the 737-9 door-plug assembly problems, the NTSB is working to pinpoint what happened on Alaska Flight 1282. Initial examination of the recovered door plug and the hole it left in the airframe showed that two guide roller tracks, one on each side near the plug's top, were fractured, NTSB engineer Clint Crookshanks said in a Jan. 8 media briefing. The fractures did not cause the plug failure but happened as the panel broke away, he added.
The plug is fixed in place during normal operations, but it is designed to move for routine maintenance inspections and to aid initial installation.
The plug's design includes 12 “stop-fitting” device fittings that keep the insert from moving outward (see diagram, page 14). When the plug is in place, fittings on it match up with stop pads around the frame. Two hinges along the plug's bottom and two guide roller fittings—one on each side of the plug near the top that fit into rollers attached to the frame—allow the plug to move up so its fittings can clear the pads and swing outward. But upward movement is possible only if four bolts are removed, effectively unlocking the plug. The bolts, secured by castellated nuts and cotter pins, are installed horizontally near each hinge and through each roller fitting.
“The exam to date has shown that the [door plug] did translate upward [and] all 12 stops became disengaged, allowing it to blow out of the fuselage,” Crookshanks said. “We have not yet recovered the four bolts that restrain it from its vertical movement, and we have not yet determined if they existed.”
Crookshanks said closer examination of the plug and other parts will reveal if each bolt worked itself free or failed—or if the bolts were never installed. Determining what happened to the four bolts is key to understanding the accident and ascertaining whether Boeing has one or multiple 737-9 problems. An initial examination of the MED on the accident aircraft's right side found no anomalies.
Several fortunate variables limited the severity of the Alaska accident, NTSB Chair Jennifer Homendy said. The two seats in Row 26 right next to the plug that tore free were not occupied. The event's timing—during climb, when passengers are often seated and belted in, instead of during cruise, when both passengers and cabin attendants are moving around—also minimized the risk, she suggested. Another lucky element in the accident sequence: The plug did not strike any part of the airframe or tail assembly.
Interior damage was significant, investigators reported. Ten rows of seats had some level of damage.
Spirit on Jan. 10 issued a statement confirming it “has been working closely with” Boeing since the accident and “is now supporting the NTSB's investigation directly.” It did not address Calhoun's comments.
Spirit's role in the 737-9 groundings expands an already lengthy list of production problems that have affected both the 737 and 787 programs—its two largest—for several years. But the plug assembly problem stands out as the first production-quality shortcoming linked to a safety-of-flight issue, triggering a fleet grounding at least and leading to an accident at worst.
“We have not had safety-related” nonconformances, Calhoun said. “This one is, and it's very important that we understand that.”
Calhoun stopped short of drawing a direct line from the fleet findings and the Alaska accident. But his comments to CNBC strongly suggest the manufacturer suspects the two are linked.
“This one is a horrible escape,” Calhoun said. “And we will tackle this one the same way [as previous issues]. We will engineer answers and be certain that can never happen again. We will look everywhere around the [737] MAX, around the Spirit factories, our own factories, our inspection processes.
“We'll make sure that we take steps to ensure that it never, never can happen again,” he added.
Beyond the reputational damage both Boeing and Spirit have suffered from the new problems, Wall Street has two questions: What are the upfront costs that will be incurred this quarter? And what are the long-term risks to production forecasts?
Upfront costs to the manufacturers to make customers whole again seem manageable, assuming they are short-lived, many financial analysts say. Based on Alaska financials, Bloomberg Intelligence estimates a cost of $25,000-30,000 a day of lost profit and crew costs due to grounded 737-9s. The initial grounding of all 170-odd aircraft could cost $5-7 million a day.
Another estimate sees costs closer to $15,000 a day. Still, according to Jefferies analysts, a two-week pause in operations could lead to $36 million in concessions.
In the longer term, however, ramifications are harder to estimate. For starters, the new master agreement Boeing and Spirit reached last fall does not obviate issues beyond the tail fin and aft bulkhead pressure fixes identified last year. It is possible that Boeing could demand new payment from Spirit related to the plug issue.
The good news: Analysts believe firm orders remain secure. “Airlines are generally unlikely to cancel a firm order given the amount of money they have to spend when initially placing the order and subsequently as production progresses,” analysts at RBC Capital Markets said Jan. 9. With more than 6,200 unfilled orders, including nearly 4,800 737 MAX-family variants, RBC said the concern around Boeing should still be focused on production execution for deliveries.
Therein lies the rub. Monthly 737 production has remained volatile for years, despite stabilization being a primary goal voiced by Boeing and Tier 1 suppliers. If the plug issue is found to be a manufacturing issue, it will only cause more perturbation.
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